VI. Recommendations
Q 23: In light of this discussion, what do you conclude with respect to the Winter Reliability Program as proposed by NEPOOL?
This package is an incremental update to the programs that have been used the past two winters. The ISO states that the Winter Reliability Program “has been proven to be a cost-effective interim means to assure fuel inventory” while the ISO completes the implementation of the full PfP market-based solution.[14]
As with previous versions of the Winter Reliability Program, the NEPOOL Proposal would remain focused on the objective of offering compensation to encourage additional fuel arrangements that in most winters are unlikely to be needed, and likely to be uneconomic. It would also continue to encourage additional dual fuel capability and winter demand response. As the ISO has stated, “the current program is, to the maximum extent possible, resource neutral.”[15]
These measures are focused on the objective of encouraging incremental capacity in the wintertime. The NEPOOL Proposal is a proven approach to encouraging fuel arrangements to provide insurance against extreme winter events, for the winter periods before PfP takes effect. The NEPOOL Proposal would be a sound and effective approach to addressing the ISO’s concern about winter fuel assurance at moderate cost.
Q 24: Under the ISO Proposal, compensation is extended to additional resource types. What is the purpose of this, according to the ISO?
The ISO’s purpose in proposing to expand the resources eligible for Winter Reliability Program payments is apparently to have the program be more resource neutral and to “better approximat[e] the results of a market-based construct.”[16] This was also stated in the ISO’s request for rehearing of the Clarification Order:[17]
“In order to continue to improve program participation and resource neutrality, the ISO will commit to discuss with stakeholders ways in which the winter program could be expanded from prior versions to include payments to all resources that can supply the region with fuel assurance; in other words, ISO-NE will work to enhance the current program structure to compensate resources such as coal and nuclear units in addition to the oil, LNG and demand resources that have participated in the past. This expansion would more closely resemble a market-based solution in terms of being available to a majority of resources, while meeting the objective of ensuring fuel adequacy in a targeted, efficient, time-limited manner.”
Q 25: Is the ISO Proposal based on the same fundamental objective as prior Winter Reliability Programs – to enhance reliability by encouraging incremental fuel arrangements?
This is not clearly stated in the ISO’s filing letter. The ISO suggests its proposal is the same as the NEPOOL proposal, with differences having to do with eligibility and associated costs:
“While the ISO and NEPOOL concur that a winter reliability program is necessary for the next few winters, and agree on many of the design features, they do not agree on the types of resources that should be eligible to participate in the program.”[18]
“In sum, the ISO and NEPOOL agree on the need for a winter program and the inclusion of oil- and LNG-fired resources within that program; in fact, the proposals are identical with respect to those two resource types. The difference between the proposals relates to the inclusion of other types of resources, and the related costs.”[19]
However, the ISO Proposal does not appear to be based on the narrow objective stated in its filing letter and the objective pursued by prior Winter Reliability Programs, which is adhered to in the NEPOOL Proposal: incremental capacity during the winter period. While the new objective is not clearly stated, it is apparently to compensate all resources that have “on-site fuel.”[20]
The objective of enhancing reliability by encouraging incremental fuel arrangements has been dropped – the ISO Proposal includes provisions that are not bound by, and do not contribute to, that objective.
Q 26: Does the ISO Proposal, with its revised objective, continue to compensate all resources that were included in prior Winter Reliability Programs consistent with the objective of the prior programs?
The ISO Proposal eliminates compensation for incremental winter demand response “due to the incompatibility of demand response with the Program’s fuel assurance objective”[21] and because ISO considers demand response “outside the program’s objective of ensuring fuel adequacy.”[22]
Q 27: What do you conclude with regard to the Winter Reliability Program as proposed by ISO?
The ISO Proposal would increase the cost of the Winter Reliability Program, but it would not result in additional capacity available in the wintertime. The ISO Proposal would result in many sellers receiving additional compensation without taking on any substantial additional obligations or costs, or providing any additional service.
Q 28: Please explain why the ISO Proposal will not lead to any incremental fuel assurance or capacity.
The ISO does not assert that its proposal would result in additional capacity available during the wintertime, nor am I aware of any work by stakeholders or from other sources suggesting that incremental capacity would be made available from the additional resource types as a result of incentives offered through the Winter Reliability Program. These resources simply do not face fuel decisions that the program’s incentives are at all likely to influence.
For example, the ISO Proposal would make compensation available to 4,041 MW of nuclear capacity. However, nuclear units run baseload, and their fuel needs are predictable and steady over time. Nuclear units typically refuel every 18 months during off-peak times, and the outages are coordinated with the ISO approximately 6 months in advance;[23] the Winter Reliability Program compensation would not influence fuel planning for a nuclear unit. Similarly, coal and biomass resources, also included in the ISO Proposal, are unlikely to modify their fuel arrangements in a manner that would result in incremental capacity as a result of the incentives offered through the Winter Reliability Program (they might, however, modify fuel arrangements to ensure maximum payments under the program).
Q 29: Please describe the potential increase in cost that would result from the ISO Proposal.
Based on the ISO’s estimated quantities and estimated compensation rate of $12.9 per equivalent barrel of oil,[24] the ISO Proposal would increase the maximum cost exposure by $35 million per year, or over 50% (Table 1). In a cold winter during which the oil and LNG stocks are drawn down such that the program only pays for 25 percent of the maximum inventory quantity for these resources, the cost of the program for these resources would be $16.5 million, while the other resources compensated under the ISO Proposal would likely still receive close to the $34.8 million maximum amount, more than tripling the total cost of the program.
Table 1: Estimated Cost of Winter Reliability Program Alternatives | ||||||
Total MW | Equiv. bbl (maximum) | Payment Rate $/bbl | Max. Cost Exposure ($ mil.) | Equiv. bbl(cold winter, @ 25%) | Total cost, cold winter ($ mil.) | |
Current program resources: | ||||||
Oil | 10,778 | 4.10 | $12.9 | $52.89 | 1.03 | $13.22 |
LNG | [6 Bcf] | 1.00 | $12.9 | $12.90 | 0.25 | $3.23 |
Total | 5.10 | $65.79 | 1.28 | $16.45 | ||
Additional resources under ISO Proposal: | ||||||
Nuclear | 4,041 | 1.62 | $12.9 | $20.90 | (no changes) | (no changes) |
Coal | 2,002 | 0.80 | $12.9 | $10.32 | ||
Biomass | 577 | 0.23 | $12.9 | $2.97 | ||
Hydro | 2,941 | 0.05 | $12.9 | $0.65 | ||
Total | 3.30 | $34.83 | $34.83 | |||
Total Cost: Current plus Additional Resources | $100.62 | $51.28 | ||||
Sources: Total MW and equivalent bbl: Gillespie Testimony, p. 17; payment rate: 2015-2016 Winter Program Payment Rate, memo from ISO New England to NEPOOL Members, July 15, 2015; equivalent bbl under moderate conditions: Wilson assumption. Due to the small quantity of demand response, their costs were excluded from this summary. |
The additional cost under the ISO Proposal amounts to $0.43/kW-mo for the 6,620 MW of nuclear, coal, biomass and other additional resources (excluding hydro) that would receive payments. This compares to the FCA payment rates for 2016/2017 (from FCA 7) of $2.744/kW-mo for resources in Rest of Pool and Maine, $2.883/kW-mo for Connecticut, and $6.661/kW-mo for existing resources in the NEMA/Boston zone.[25]